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THE CASE FOR ISOLATIONISM


	Just  before World  War  II, many  Americans,  mostly on  the
political  right, advocated that  the United  States stay out  of the
affairs of the rest of the world and rely for its defense on  its own
strength.  The motives for  this were various, traditional, suspicion
of  foreigners, and  also, in some  cases, sympathy  with the Fascist
regimes that the  other side wanted to  prepare to fight.   The other
side argued that  Fascism was a menace and the  sooner we prepared to
stop it the better.  Since we  eventually had to enter the War  under
conditions of direct attack, the isolationist argument was considered
refuted  by almost all  Americans.  After  World War  II, most people
considered that  we had  learned  our lesson,  and when  they  became
convinced that Communism  was also a menace, supported  the policy of
having  the  United  States organize  and  lead  a  coalition against
Communism. 

	The alliance organized by the United States  was duly formed.
Under  its  banner, the  United  States  helped rehabilitate  Western
Europe and Japan, and this  rehabilitation was successful.  When  the
Korean War occurred,  the allies helped  the United States  fight it.
The  allied  contribution was  small,  but this  was  excused  on the
grounds that the European countries were still recovering  from World
War  II.   When the  Vietnnam  War heated  up in  1965, the  European
countries  did not contribute at all  although their recovery was now
complete and they were very prosperous.  Why was this? 

	The reasons seem to be about as follows:

	1. The  American political leaders  were quite aroused  about
what they believed  was a major menace in Vietnam  that would lead to
more trouble if not dealt with. 

	2. Some of the European  leaders sympathized with the  United
States,  but  they  did  not regard  the  menace  as  acute  to  them
especially  as the United  States was dealing  with it.   Moreover, a
large part of their  public opinion didn't  believe in the menace  at
all.  They would  have had a major political fight  on their hands to
contribute even token forces and the United States didn't press them.
Perhaps Johnson felt that the  forces would be token in any  case and
that without them he had a free hand. 

	3.  As the  Vietnam War  dragged on,  it  became increasingly
unpleasant to American  middle class youth,  and became  increasingly
unpopular with intellectuals, with Congress and  with Europeans.  The
view  became widespread  in  all these  circles that  after  all, the
United States was the villain, and there was no Communist menace that
justified the military action and the killing they caused. 

	4. The  European leaders came into  an increasingly anomolous
position.  On the one hand, the American Vietnam position became more
and more unpopular, and  it would obviously be  politically foolhardy
to  defend it or,  worse yet,  advocate any direct  European military
assistance.  On the  other hand, their fear  of the Soviet Union  has
not  entirely disappeared.    It was  revived  by the  occupation  of
Czechoslovakia  and by  the evidence  that the  Soviet Union  was not
moving in the direction of internal democracy, by its  willingness to
support military  adventures in the  Middle East and wherever  else a
safe  opportunity  arose  under  the  slogan  of  supporting wars  of
national liberation.  From this point of view,  it is quite important
for them to keep the 300,000 American troops in Europe. 

	5.  Fortunately,  for the  political  peace  of  mind of  the
European leaders, the United States has not pressed the issue.   Even
McGovern supported  keeping the troops  in Western Europe,  and Nixon
proposes removing them  only as part of a general settlement with the
Russians. 

	6. All this  puts the  United States in  a strange  political
position that is becoming increasingly untenable.  Namely, the United
States  considers itself the  leader of a  defensive alliance against
Communism, the other  members of  which do ever  less to sustain  the
alliance  and increasingly  criticize what  the U.S.  does.   This is
especially odd, because of all the  countries of the world, the  U.S.
is the least threatened  by the menace for reasons  of geography, the
political   attituded   of   its   population,   and  its   economic,
technological, and  military  strength.   Politically,  however,  the
United States is becoming weaker and weaker both at home and abroad. 

	7. Before discussing  what might be done, it  is necessary to
evaluate  the alleged menace  itself.   Is Communism a  menace to the
freedom of the rest of the world?  To a certain extent, the answer is
a clear  yes.  Communist  countries are ruled  by the politbureaus of
their Communist parties  which control information  as completely  as
they can, allow no political opposition,  and interpret all political
events in self-righteous terms that could easily justify any external
aggressive action  as defensive or  as an  act of  liberation of  the
people  of  the country  attacked.    Any  change in  this  political
situation seems unlikely as long as the present generation of leaders
live and problematical after that.  On the other  hand, the Communist
countries have engaged in external military action under very limited
circumstances and have mainly confined themselves to giving  military
equipment to foreign governments and movements that seemed to advance
their objectives.  Their total external military activity since World
War II has definitely been less  than that of the United States.   Of
course, the reason for this might  be that a more directly aggressive
policy has  been averted only by the activities of the anti-Communist
alliance lead by the United States. 

	8. I contend that no-one really knows whether there is a real
Communist military menace - not even the Communists.  Even if one had
a tape  recording of  all the  meetings of  the politbureaus  of  the
Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties and also  a tape of the meetings
of their  General Staffs, one would  still be in doubt.   In order to
illustrate this point,  consider the  statement made by  Lin Piao  in
1965 when he was  at the height of his power.   In this statement, he
compared the villages of China to the underdeveloped countries of the
world and  the cities  of China  to the  industrialized countries  of
Europe  and  North  America.    He  said that  just  as  the  Chinese
Communists organized  the  villages  first and  then  surrounded  and
captured  the  cities,  so   the  people  would  win  first   in  the
underdeveloped countries  and then take power  in Europe and America.
One may also cite the  slogan of Che Guevara advocating "two,  three,
many Vietnams".   Consider that Lin Piao had never  been out of China
in  his life, consider  that the  statement was based  on a Communist
ideology that is extremely prone to wishful thinking  both in general
and about  particular situations, and  consider what happened  to Lin
Piao.  If he couldn't predict what was going to happen in China,  how
can we put much credence  in what he said about the world  as a whole
except  as an expression  of what he  hoped would happen  and what he
would support if  there were  a sufficiently attractive  opportunity.
Guevara is  also no longer  with us  and his Latin  American Vietnams
didn't materialize.  

	On the other hand, just because Lin Piao and Guevara couldn't
predict the future, it doesn't follow that anyone else can either. 

	9. The main  point of  this essay is  that the United  States
should  get  out of  its  untenable political  position  even at  the
possible cost of more military trouble  later.  To put the matter  in
terms of slogans,  consider that early  in the Vietnam war  the Hawks
raised the slogan, "Wouldn't you rather fight them in Vietnam than in
Hawaii?" I would raise the counter-slogan, "Much better in Hawaii, if
it came to fighting in Hawaii, we  would really know we had to fight,
and we would do it much better."

	Actually,  the  slogan  doesn't  really  quite  describe  the
possible eventualities or the policy I advocate. I  advocate that the
United  States  adopt a  deliberate  policy of  doing  less than  the
countries directly menaced.  If they  are really menaced and if  they
are doing all they can, we will help them  if they need it.  However,
we  will not be the  first to organize unless  the threat is directly
against us.    In particular,  we  should  withdraw our  troops  from
Western  Europe.   If it  can be  done  as part  of a  deal with  the
Russians,  fine.  Otherwise, we should  withdraw unilaterally and not
come back except  in case of dire  necessity and under conditions  to
total European effort.   Only this will force  them to maintain their
own political  defenses and  prevent  them from  subordinating  their
defense problem to  other political considerations like  their mutual
rivalry. 

	Admittedly,  this  policy  has disadvantages.    One  or more
countries might have  to be lost  to Communism  before the menace  is
realized.   If we  had to fight,  the terrain might  be worse  and we
might  have to  do without  advanced bases  so the fighting  might be
harder.   There are also  some risks  of nuclear  war that might  not
exist under the present policy. 

	However, the  advantages outweigh them.  First,  we might not
have to fight at all.  It  is quite possible that the Communist  will
not attempt military adventures and that local  Communist will not be
able  to overthrow  governments.   It is also  possible, that  a less
active  military policy  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  will
contribute to  Communist mellowing and political  liberalization when
the  present leaders pass  on.  On  the other hand, if  a menace does
develop, we and the menaced will be able to fight it whole-heartedly.
The major  reason, though, is that the  present policy is politically
untenable, because too many people all  over the world are coming  to
regard us  as the  menace because  of propaganda  and because of  our
greater military  activity than the major Communist  countries.  I do
not see how this  political trend can be reversed  as long as we  are
militarily more  active than they.   In fact, there is  a danger, not
large  as yet,  that they might  be able  to enlist  countries we are
trying to defend into a crusade against us. 

	These arguments  do not say  in themselves  what to do  about
Vietnam.   The doctrine  would certainly  not allow  getting into  the
situation we were  in in  1966-1968 when we  were doing  most of  the
fighting and the South Vietnamese were mostly  watching, but now that
the South Vietnames are carrying the burden of their own defense, the
doctrine would allow us to help them.  It does require, however, that
we  reduce our  effort to  the qualitative  level that  the Communist
powers  are giving to the other side.   Therefore, we should agree  to
stop our air support and blockade if the Communist will give back our
prisoners  and maybe  we should  stop it  anyhow.   I  don't think  we
should stop supplying the South Vietnamese except as part of a mutual
agreement  with the  Russians and  Chinese.   Of  course,  it may  be
possible  to secure  an actual  peace there if  both sides  are tired
enough of fighting.